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EUGENIE BRINKEMA:  THE FORMS OF THE AFFECTS 
DURHAM AND LONDON: DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2014. 
 
[A slightly revised version of this pre-print has been accepted for publication in Projections. The Journal 
for Movies and Mind. Volume 9, No. 1, 2015. Please refer to the printed version.] 
 
 
How feelings can “inhere” in lifeless objects is a challenge to analytic thinking. 
—Susanne K. Langer (Feeling and Form) 
 
I. 
This is a remarkable book. 
 
Eugenie Brinkema’s The Forms of the Affects is remarkable for its virtuoso style: always am-
bitiously crafted, often elegantly written, at times bordering on the literary. It has been a long 
time since a film theoretical text has put so much emphasis on language and played so osten-
sibly with words. The last one may have been Vivian Sobchack’s The Address of the Eye 
(1992). 
 
It is remarkable for the immensity of its sophistication and the erudition put on display: with 
countless passages in French, German, Latin and Greek, with numerous quotes from Mal-
larmé, Shakespeare, Finnegan’s Wake, and other works of high canonical literature, with a 
myriad of quotations from philosophers like Nietzsche, Heidegger, or Derrida, woven into a 
quirky quote quilt. Here is a young scholar with a fascinating and intimidating grasp on con-
tinental philosophy and psychoanalysis, cultural theory, literary theory, and film theory. 
 
The book is remarkable also for the enjoyable audacity of its attack on contemporary film 
studies and the cunningness with which Brinkema reprimands famous scholars like Slavoj 
Žižek and Noël Carroll (and lesser known ones like Sianne Ngai, Walter Metz, and Marco 
Abel). According to Brinkema, Žižek “vomits” up previously used examples in his later texts 
(293); and she claims that one can easily imagine a whole chorus of continental philosophers 
“retching” at Carroll’s claims about disgust (136). Not since the appearance of Daniel Framp-
ton’s Filmosophy (2006) have I encountered a book that is so explicit and grandiose in its 
attempt to repudiate others and start from scratch. Much like D.N. Rodowick in his recent 
Elegy for Theory (2014), she wants to revalidate “ever-speculative theory” (39) but much 
more than the polite Rodowick she engages in a number of polemical brawls. 
 
Finally, and most important, the oeuvre (let’s not call it a study) is remarkable for how much 
intellectual energy Brinkema has put into it—and how little film scholars, to whom this book 
is first and foremost addressed, will ultimately be able to do with it. We are dealing here, in 
other words, with a remarkably frustrating work of remarkably frustrating brilliance. 
 
II. 
Brinkema, currently associate professor at MIT, divides her book into a preface (“Ten Points 
to Begin”), nine chapters and two intervals. She focuses on the affects of nostalgia, grief, 
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disgust, anxiety, and joy as well as the expressive and communicative response of crying. It 
is difficult—maybe outright impossible—to summarize these chapters, as they are both ex-
tremely densely argued and sometimes clouded by opaque formulations. The films she dis-
cusses in more detail are Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960), Michael Haneke’s Funny Games 
(1997), David Lynch’s Wild at Heart (1990) and Six Figures Getting Sick (1967), Peter Gre-
enaway’s The Cook, the Thief, the Wife, and Her Lover (1989), Chris Kentis’s Open Water 
(2003), and Hollis Frampton’s Zorns Lemma (1970). 
 
Brinkema sets out to chastise contemporary film studies (and the humanities more generally) 
for not having paid enough attention to form. She “demands the total redefining of formalism 
in and for film studies” and orders the discipline to “dethrone the subject and the spectator” 
(36). Insisting on the metaphor of the film-as-text, she asks for more close readings of the 
textual forms of films. But, and this is one of her central moves, she connects film formalism 
tightly with the notion of affect, hence the title The Forms of the Affects. While in its insis-
tence on the two plurals this title might look strange or mannerist at first sight, it is here that 
we find one of the profound provocations of the book. Brinkema wants to break with the gen-
eralizing tendencies that she finds, for instance, in cognitivism or film-phenomenology. In-
stead, she aims to zoom in on detailed readings of specific forms and specific affects. 
 
However, and here we encounter yet another provocation, affects are not something to be 
experienced by a viewing subject, as cognitivists and film-phenomenologists would insist. 
They are to be found exteriorized in a text and as this text. Initially drawing on Deleuze’s 
notion of affect, Brinkema ultimately aims to go beyond the French philosopher and his fol-
lowers in film and media theory like Steven Shaviro, Brian Massumi, or Lisa Cartwright. She 
believes that these scholars still cling too much to bodies affected by affects: “Affect, as I 
theorize it here, has fully shed the subject, but my argument goes a step further and also loses 
for affects the body and bodies. This book regards any individual affect as a self-folding exte-
riority that manifests in, as, and with textual form” (25). Affects do not need an experiencing 
subject—there are forms and there are affects, and the affects have forms just as much as they 
inhere in forms. 
 
This argument is slightly reminiscent of a similar one put forth by philosopher Susanne K. 
Langer in Feeling and Form (1953), a book Brinkema does not mention. For Langer there is 
a similarity between the dynamics of an art form and the dynamics of emotional life. The way 
a piece of music is structured, for example, is analogous or isomorphic to the feeling of tran-
sience— that is the experience of the passage of time. But Langer never goes as far as identi-
fying a specific emotion like sadness; she rather refers to general patterns of affective experi-
ences: to feelings and not concrete emotions. Brinkema ventures further. She does not only 
maintain that filmic structures resemble the structures of affects—she maintains that specific 
filmic structures resemble specific affects like joy or disgust. And even this formulation does 
not exhaust her intervention. She even claims that certain filmic structures are these affects. 
Or, to put it differently, the way a certain film is structured is an affect itself. 
For instance, she states that in Haneke’s Funny Games “form itself takes up the pecu-
liarly painful suffering” of grief (99). She intends to analyze grief not in terms of narrative 
content, but as a matter of form, composition and structure—and the structure “that is the 
affect of grief” is the tableau (99). In her detailed analysis she comes to the conclusion that 
“it is the form of Haneke’s film above all that grieves” (100). Now, it is one thing to say that 
a film is “expressive of” grief, as the philosopher of music Peter Kivy might claim for a piece 
of music; and it is quite another thing to assert that a filmic form is able to grieve. Or is this 
just a play on words? 





In order to answer this question let us come back to the use of language. In her book on form 
Brinkema lights a veritable formal firework herself. It would be an understatement to claim 
that her rhetoric is excessive. Even in her many elegant ekphrastic descriptions of filmic 
scenes language imposes itself with mighty force, and in her more opaque passages the me-
dium fully obliterates and obscures. Just to pick a random example, here is how she summa-
rizes Nietzsche’s take on joy: “The ethical stance of joy involves an avowal that one will will 
[sic] that which one will will [sic] might return, that one will refuse to affirm a weakly will-
ing of the just-once—this ambitious jubilation deriving from what Deleuze calls Nietzsche’s 
loathing of ‘little compensations, the little pleasures, the little joys’” (244). 
 
Like so many deconstructivists she is feverishly fond of the history of words, performing at 
various places, and with dizzying speed, “an etymological dance” (243), as she calls it, never 
afraid of the specter of etymological fallacy. And just like Derrida she has a knack for defa-
miliarizing neologisms. What for the French philosopher was différance, for Brinkema is 
mise-n’en-scène: “Mise-n’en-scène suggests that in addition to reading for what is put into 
the scene, one must also read for all of its permutations: what is not put into the scene; what 
is put into the non-scene, and what is not enough put into the scene” (46). Never shy of show-
ing us how to juggle with words, she goes particularly wild on the homonymy of the words 
palate/palette/pallet in a chapter on Greenaway. 
 
This might be tolerated as mere playfulness. More problematic is Brinkema’s fondness for 
sentence structures in which some kind of agency is ascribed to form or time or the image, as 
if these were active and sentient beings. Just consider the sentence in which she reproaches 
Thomas Elsaesser for not asking “how form might imbue itself with intensities” in his discus-
sion of melodrama (43). Or when she claims that the loss of a person or a thing in the filmic 
diegesis is not only a trauma to a character in the film, but it is also “a formal trauma to film 
and its endlessly recuperative ability to make absent things present” (94). Hence much like 
recent scholars who have argued that images live, act, and desire—think of W.J.T. Mitchell 
or Horst Bredekamp—Brinkema does indeed claim that films have affects (for a recent cri-
tique of such claims, see Wiesing 2013). 
 
Apart from such questionable metaphysical assumptions her readings also display a problem-
atic methodological use of language. This becomes particularly evident when looking at one 
of her stylistic darlings: the hyperbole. Her verbal exaggerations often create what Brinkema 
sets out to describe. For instance, when she talks about a light beam at the compositional cen-
ter of the famous long-take scene that follows the shooting of the son in Funny Games, she 
characterizes it as “violently pure,” with a “sharp” and “forceful” shape. What other viewers 
might consider a neutral light source becomes strongly affect-laden through hyperbolic lan-
guage. In other words, Brinkema writes the affect into the scene. 
 
Brinkema might respond that she does indeed experience this light beam as violent and sharp 
and forceful. But then she would resort to her own experience as the fundament of her de-
scription—a viewer response that she otherwise wants to desperately get rid of. Brinkema 
often displays an admirably ambitious will to be entirely anticommonsensical, but this some-
times comes at the price of making sense. As a phenomenologist, I have a hard time accept-
ing the harsh separation of affects from someone experiencing these affects. And Brinkema 
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does not seem consistent here either. Or how would she explain the use of the qualifiers 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ when talking about affects, as when she calls disgust the “strongest 
negative affect” (178)? An affect is usually qualified as positive or negative because of the 
pleasure or displeasure it evokes, precisely for someone experiencing it. 
 
This is not the only time when her arguments strain logic. At one point she notes that the 
more rigorously structured a film and hence the more formalist it is, the more affective it is 
(178). Only two pages later she claims that even seemingly antiformalist genre films—like 
Open Water—are “governed by a rigorous formalism” (180). But if everything is rigorously 
structured and rigorously formalist, then every film is extremely affective and the whole 
point is lost. Moreover, since she insists on decoupling form from narrative thematics, one 
would expect a specific affect to reoccur in every instance of the form that Brinkema has as-
cribed to it. For instance, grief must ‘inhere’ in every filmic tableau. But this is certainly not 
the case. While in Haneke’s Funny Games grief might be related to the stasis of the tableau, 




For all her acute polemics against contemporary film and affect studies (and affect studies 
within film studies), it is also astonishing how little she engages with current approaches to 
film form and style: from David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson’s neoformalism to Barry 
Salt’s statistical style analysis or the work of V.F. Perkins and the journal Movie, to name but 
a few. If film studies should entirely think over its understanding of form, it would have been 
illuminating to hear what these existing approaches do wrong. Moreover, one might have 
expected her to take a look at formalism in musicology and the philosophy of music, to which 
I have hinted above and in which the debate about the expression of emotions and feelings in 
musical structure and style has a long tradition (for a helpful overview, see Alperson 2004). 
In general, Brinkema is rather generous with her omissions of seminal scholarly literature. In 
her discussion of crying there is no word of Helmuth Plessner; when she goes into detail 
about the importance of the body in humanities discourses she does not mention Vivian Sob-
chack; when dealing with the relation of affect and film Raymond Bellour’s idea of the un-
folding of emotions and the notion of “vitality affect,” which he derives from Daniel Stern, 
do not occur. 
 
Considering her goal of reclaiming form for film studies, she reserves an astonishing amount 
of space to anything but films. Whole chapters are devoted to exegeses of Barthes’s Camera 
Lucida or Freud’s “Inhibition, Symptom, Anxiety.” I do not dispute that these readings are in 
and of themselves intriguing or even brilliant. But there is a marked disproportion: I often 
found myself wondering whether the time and space dedicated to these texts should not have 
spent on further readings of films. This is all the more true once we take into account that 
some of her analyses are highly illuminating, as when she treats Open Water as a kind of 
temporalized abstract painting à la Rothko. 
 
One could also question her use of willfully one-sided arguments, as when in her chapter on 
crying she erects a straw man—the claim that tears are nothing but an expression of emo-
tion—only to fight it with all her rhetoric power. One could bemoan that she often merely 
rehearses a number of familiar moves in the gymnastics of contemporary film and visual 
studies: away from narrative, away from representation, away from the senses of vision to-
wards touch. Finally, one may criticize her fondness of the deconstructivist sleight of hand 
that is always able to magically turn a seemingly contingent and insignificant detail into 
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something important. Just take her lengthy interrogation of whether the drop of water on the 
face of Marion Crane, lying dead on the bathroom floor in Hitchcock’s Psycho, is a teardrop 
or a splash of water from the shower. 
 
Taking into consideration that Brinkema’s long essay is also a book about taste, one might 
claim that, in the end, it is a matter of taste what we expect from a book in film studies: play-
fulness or insightfulness, cleverness or a gain in knowledge? Depending on one’s taste, the 
affects this book on The Forms of the Affects produces may take many forms: admiration or 
frustration, wonder or anger, surprise or puzzlement. While I have a high regard for 
Brinkema’s frightening breadth of reading, her clever way of associating, and her dazzling 
stylistics, I see little immediate gain to be taken from this remarkable book. But for all its 
shortcomings, it may indeed have an important merit, albeit in the long run and only indi-
rectly. At one point in the future we may recognize that our resistance to Brinkema’s polem-
ics has made us more aware of the way filmic forms and affects resemble one another, how 
form informs the viewers’ affects, how affect is more than a matter of characters and narra-
tion. Time will tell. 
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